Abstract-Quantitative theories of information flow are of growing interest, due to the fundamental importance of protecting confidential information from improper disclosure, together with the unavoidability of "small" leaks in practical systems. But while it is tempting to measure leakage using classic information-theoretic concepts like Shannon entropy and mutual information, these turn out not to provide very satisfactory security guarantees. As a result, several researchers have developed an alternative theory based on Rényi's minentropy. In this theory, uncertainty is measured in terms of a random variable's vulnerability to being guessed in one try by an adversary; note that this is the complement of the Bayes Risk. In this paper, we survey the main theory of min-entropy leakage in deterministic and probabilistic systems, including comparisons with mutual information leakage, results on mincapacity, results on channels in cascade, and techniques for calculating min-entropy leakage in systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental challenges in computer security is to control the flow of information, whether to prevent confidential information from being leaked, or to prevent trusted information from being tainted. But while it is sometimes possible to stop undesirable information flows completely, it is perhaps more typical that some undesirable flows are unavoidable. For instance an ATM machine that rejects an incorrect PIN thereby reveals that the secret PIN differs from the one that was entered. Similarly, revealing the tally of votes in an election reveals some information about the secret ballots that were cast. More subtly, the amount of time taken by a cryptographic operation may be observable by an adversary, and may inadvertently reveal information about the secret key. As a result, the last decade has seen growing interest in quantitative theories of information flow [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , which allow us to talk about "how much" information is leaked and (perhaps) allow us to tolerate "small" leaks.
Information theory [6] , [7] offers a very general setting for such theories in its notion of a channel. Channels do not rely on any explicit notion of "messages"; instead they capture relationships between system inputs and outputs through a channel matrix, which gives the conditional probability of each possible output, given each possible input. (Note that "output" should be understood to encompass any aspects of the system's behavior that are observable to an adversary, possibly including time.) Within this framework, it is natural to quantify leakage of confidential information based on the extent to which a channel's output helps an adversary to determine the secret input.
We might also wish to quantify integrity. But while there is important recent work [8] , [9] that approaches quantitative integrity by considering the extent to which trusted outputs are "influenced" or "tainted" by untrusted inputs, appropriate metrics for integrity seem less clear than for confidentiality. For this reason, we restrict our attention to quantitative confidentiality in the rest of this paper.
Given the stature of information theory, it is tempting to measure leakage of confidential information using classic concepts like Shannon entropy and mutual information. But its celebrated results, like the noisy channel coding theorem [6] , really address a different sort of question than what concerns us here. They address the question of how quickly a channel can reliably transmit a stream of inputs-with respect to confidentiality, in contrast, the crucial question is whether there is a significant risk that the secret input might be guessed from the output. In 1956, Claude Shannon himself warned of the danger of applying information theory indiscriminately:
While we feel that information theory is indeed a valuable tool in providing fundamental insights into the nature of communication problems and will continue to grow in importance, it is certainly no panacea for the communications engineer or, a fortiori, for anyone else. Seldom do more than a few of nature's secrets give way at one time. [10] Indeed we will see that, in the context of confidentiality against an adversary trying to guess the secret, measuring leakage using mutual information does not result in very satisfactory security guarantees. For this reason, a number of researchers have developed an alternative theory of quantitative information flow based on Rényi's min-entropy [11] . In this theory, uncertainty is measured in terms of a random variable's vulnerability to being guessed in one try by an adversary; note that this is the complement of the Bayes Risk.
The goal of this paper is to present the main theory of minentropy leakage, collecting results from the recent literature, and also to point out some directions for future research. Specifically, Section II presents the basic definitions of mutual information and min-entropy leakage in deterministic and probabilistic channels, comparing their suitability with respect to confidentiality. Section III presents basic results about min-capacity, which is the maximum min-entropy leakage over all a priori distributions. Section IV gives a more speculative discussion of some deeper questions about the relationship between min-entropy leakage and mutual information. Section V describes results on the min-entropy leakage of a cascade of channels. Section VI surveys some recent work on calculating (or approximating) the minentropy leakage of probabilistic or deterministic systems. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS
In this section, we begin by recalling important concepts of information theory [6] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [7] , such as Shannon entropy and mutual information, and then present the motivation and basic definitions of the min-entropy measure of information leakage.
A channel is a triple ( , , ), where is a finite set of secret input values, is a finite set of observable output values, and is an | | × | | matrix, called the channel matrix, such that
[ , ] is the conditional probability of obtaining output given that the input is . Formally, each entry of is a real number between 0 and 1, and each row sums to 1. An important special case is a deterministic channel, in which each input produces a unique output. In terms of , this means that each entry is either 0 or 1, and each row contains exactly one 1.
Any a priori distribution on determines a random variable . Moreover, and determine a joint probability matrix ★ on × , where
It can be shown that ★ is the unique joint distribution that recovers the a priori by marginalization:
and recovers the conditional probabilities in , whenever they are defined:
Also ★ gives a marginal distribution on :
giving a random variable .
We quantify the amount of information that flows from to by considering an adversary who wishes to find out the value of . It is natural to measure information leakage by comparing 's "uncertainty" about before and after seeing the value of , using the equation leakage = initial uncertainty -remaining uncertainty.
A. Measuring leakage using mutual information
Until recently, the literature on quantitative information flow (for example, [1] , [16] , [3] , [17] ) generally defined "initial uncertainty" using Shannon entropy [6] :
and "remaining uncertainty" using conditional Shannon entropy:
This leads to defining leakage as mutual information:
In the special case of a deterministic channel, note that we have ( | ) = 0, since the value of is determined by the value of . Using the fact that mutual information is symmetric, this gives a simpler formula for leakage in a deterministic channel:
A critical question about any leakage measure, however, is whether it gives good operational security guarantees. In particular we would like to know whether the measure of remaining uncertainty accurately reflects the threat to , given . Of course, answering this question depends on our model of what the adversary can do. Here we focus on an adversary who tries to guess the value of in a bruteforce manner, using the value of as a "clue". For ( | ), Massey's guessing entropy bound [18] shows that ( | ), the expected number of guesses required to guess given , grows exponentially with ( | ). This is the sort of operational security guarantee that we seek in trying to justify a measure of quantitative information flow. There is, however, a serious weakness to this particular bound; it turns out that ( | ) can be arbitrarily high even when is highly vulnerable to being guessed by in one try.
To illustrate, consider the following example from [19] : , since is leaked completely whenever ∕ = 1. But nevertheless the guessing entropy is high, since nothing is leaked when = 1 (except the fact that the last three bits are not all 0):
It is instructive to compare program (2) with
which simply copies the last 9 bits of into . The mutual information leakage of program (3) is 9, making it worse than program (2), even though it gives a probability of guessing in one try of only 2 −55 , since the first 55 bits of remain completely unknown.
B. Measuring leakage using min-entropy
In view of the unsatisfactory security guarantees given by mutual information leakage, it was proposed in [19] to define "uncertainty" in terms of the vulnerability of to being guessed correctly in one try by . If we make the worst-case assumption that knows and , then the a priori vulnerability is
and the a posteriori vulnerability is
Note that ( | ) is the complement of Bayes risk, which was used as an anonymity metric in [20] . Adversary can achieve these vulnerabilities with a simple guessing strategy. A priori, should guess some that maximizes [ ]. A posteriori, should guess some that maximizes ★ [ , ] ; this corresponds to looking down column of the joint matrix ★ . Notice that the time required by is linear in the size of . Of course, one can imagine scenarios where is extremely large. Consider for instance a channel whose input is a uniformlydistributed 100-digit prime , and whose output is , where is a uniformly-distributed 101-digit prime. 1 In this case,
has a unique nonzero entry-but it is not easy for to find it! Thus we emphasize that vulnerability is information theoretic, rather than computational.
We convert from vulnerability to uncertainty by taking the negative logarithm, giving Rényi's min-entropy [11] . Our definitions, then, are
Finally, we define the min-entropy leakage from to , denoted ℒ , to be
Thus min-entropy leakage is the logarithm of the factor by which knowledge of increases the one-guess vulnerability of . The last formula for ℒ can be rewritten directly in terms of the joint matrix ★ :
in which the numerator and denominator differ only in the order of the sum and maximum operations. Notice that the numerator is the sum of the column maximums, while the denominator is the maximum of the row sums. Revisiting program (2), we find that its min-entropy leakage is 61.00, reflecting the fact that ( | ) ≈ 1 8 . In contrast, for program (3) the min-entropy leakage is 9, reflecting the fact that ( | ) = 2 −55 . Thus min-entropy leakage judges program (2) to have far greater leakage than program (3).
We remark that conditional min-entropy ∞ ( | ) was not defined by Rényi [11] , and there is no universally agreedupon definition [21, p. 16] , [22, section 2.4 ]. Our definition above is equivalent to the following definition from [22] :
In contrast, the definition from [21] is equivalent to
Repositioning the "log" in the definition makes a big difference-in fact, if we used the latter definition of ∞ ( | ), it turns out that the min-entropy leakage of program (2) would be 8.17 bits, the same as its mutual information leakage.
Because min-entropy leakage is defined by
it might seem tempting to denote it as ∞ ( ; ), by analogy with mutual information. We do not adopt this notation, however, because of the crucial difference that mutual information is symmetric:
while min-entropy leakage is not:
In thinking about the definition of min-entropy leakage, the fact that it is defined based on one-guess vulnerability may seem questionable, since there are certainly scenarios in which would be able to make multiple guesses. It is instructive to compare program (2) with
which copies the first 61 bits of into , masking out the last 3 bits. The min-entropy leakage of program (5) is 61 bits, which is the same as that of program (2) . Yet one might feel that program (5) is clearly more dangerous, since it always allows to determine within 8 guesses, while program (2) reveals almost nothing about seven-eighths of the time. But suppose that is in a scenario where it is reluctant to guess, because making a wrong guess would trigger an alarm. In that case, program (2) might reasonably be judged to be worse because, whenever ∕ = 1, knows the value of exactly.
Perhaps the best conclusion is that the appropriateness of any measure of information leakage always needs to be assessed with respect to a specific adversary model. And, following Shannon's warning, we should certainly not view min-entropy leakage as a panacea. Still, oneguess vulnerability seems to be a basic enough concern to support useful conclusions in a wide variety of scenarios. For instance, useful bounds can often be obtained simply by observing that allowing guesses at most increases the vulnerability by a factor of . Thus if we write for -guess vulnerability, we have
Hence if the one-guess vulnerability is negligible, then the -guess vulnerability will also be negligible, assuming that is not too large.
III. MIN-CAPACITY
An important notion in information theory is channel capacity, which is the maximum leakage over all possible a priori distributions. When we measure leakage using mutual information, we will use the name Shannon capacity, and when we measure leakage using min-entropy, we will use the name min-capacity and the notation ℳℒ( ). While calculating the Shannon capacity of a channel matrix is in general difficult, calculating the min-capacity is easy, as it is just the logarithm of the sum of the column maximums of [23] , [24] : Theorem 3.1: For any channel matrix ,
and it is realized on a uniform distribution on (and possibly on other distributions as well).
Proof: Using the formulas in Section II we have
The upper bound is realized when is uniformly distributed. It can also be realized on nonuniform distributions, provided that some proper subset of the rows of includes at least one maximum from each column.
Min-capacity is of interest because it frees us from the need to know the a priori , focusing more simply on the "worst-case" leakage of the channel. Indeed, min-entropy leakage can sometimes be surprisingly dependent on the a priori distribution. Consider the following example, which illustrates the so-called base-rate fallacy. Suppose that is the channel matrix of an imperfect test for cancer: Moreover, suppose that for the population under consideration (say, age 40-50, no symptoms, no family history) the a priori distribution is
Then, although the channel might appear to be quite reliable, we find that the min-entropy leakage is 0. For if we calculate the min-entropy leakage ℒ using equation (4) [cancer] = 0.008, but still much less than 0.500.) In general, even if some increases or decreases the probability of some , there is no min-entropy leakage unless the changed probability causes to make a different guess. 2 In contrast, min-capacity behaves more straightforwardly. For instance, it is an easy corollary to Theorem 3.1 that the min-capacity of is 0 iff has no leakage at all [24] : Corollary 3.2: ℳℒ( ) = 0 iff the rows of are identical.
As another corollary, the min-capacity of a deterministic channel is just the logarithm of the number of feasible outputs. Interestingly, this is also the Shannon capacity [19] :
If is deterministic, then its mincapacity and Shannon capacity coincide, with both equal to log | | (assuming that every element of is feasible). Proof: Assume that every element of is feasible. By Theorem 3.1, the min-capacity of is the logarithm of the sum of its column maximums. Since each entry of is 0 or 1, this is just log | |.
Moreover, the Shannon capacity of a deterministic channel is the maximum value of ( ) over all a priori distributions . This maximum is log | |, since has | | feasible values and we can construct a that makes them all equally likely. (Note that this will typically not be a uniform distribution on .)
Hence it does not matter for deterministic channels whether we measure capacity using min-capacity or Shannon capacity. However, as we will see in Section IV, this coincidence does not carry over to the general case of probabilistic channels.
One useful way to bound min-capacity is by finding a factorization of the channel matrix, which corresponds to decomposing a channel into the cascade [12] of two channels.
Theorem 3.4:
If channel matrix = , where and are channel matrices, then the min-capacity of is at most log | |, the logarithm of the "inner dimension" of the matrix product. Intuitively, viewing as a pipe, the number of rows of is the size of the input end, and the number of columns of is the size of the output end. In the case where = , where the inner dimension is small, we can view the pipe as being narrow in the middle, which prevents it from leaking very much. Theorem 3.4 is proved in [24] , where it is used to bound the min-entropy leakage of timing attacks against public-key cryptosystems implemented using the defenses of blinding and bucketing. 2 This example also illustrates the fact that min-entropy leakage is not symmetric. For if we view ★ as a channel from to , we find that ℒ ≈ 0.01 > 0 = ℒ . Intuitively, helps in guessing because, in the rare case when is cancer, 's best guess for changes from negative to positive.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIN-ENTROPY LEAKAGE AND MUTUAL INFORMATION
It is valuable to study the mathematical properties of minentropy leakage, in particular by studying the relationship between min-entropy leakage, ℒ , and leakage measured by mutual information, ( ; ), or by other measures. Understanding such relationships is important because (as Shannon warned) it is misguided to expect any single measure to be ideal in all situations. 3 One question of particular interest concerns the relationship between Shannon capacity and min-capacity. As shown in Theorem 3.3, these capacities coincide for deterministic channels, but this coincidence fails for probabilistic channels. To demonstrate, let be a square channel matrix with 2 64 − 2 54 + 1 rows and columns, whose entries are all 2 −64 except on the main diagonal, where the entries are all 2 −10 : 
Note that this is a valid channel matrix, since its row sums are 2 −10 +(2 64 −2 54 )⋅2 −64 = 1. Because is symmetric, we can easily calculate its Shannon capacity using a formula in [7] : capacity = log| | − (row) = log(2 64 − 2 54 + 1)
Thus the Shannon capacity of is about one-twentieth of a bit.
Calculating the min-capacity is even easier, as it is just the log of the sum of the column maximums, all of which are 2 −10 :
The min-capacity of approximately 54 bits reflects the fact that, under a uniform a priori distribution, increases the vulnerability from about 2 −64 to 2
−10 .) That is, enables to guess a (roughly) 64-bit secret with probability 1/1024. Thus this example shows how misleading Shannon capacity can be as a measure of security risk.
Generalizing from this example, one can show that for any ≥ 3, there exists a × channel matrix whose mincapacity exceeds its Shannon capacity by a factor of /2.
Another important property comes from the Santhi-Vardy bound [25] :
Here is the adversary's probability of error in guessing given ; it is thus the same as 1 − ( | ). Hence we can rewrite the Santhi-Vardy bound to 2
showing that the remaining uncertainty under Shannon entropy is at most the remaining uncertainty under minentropy. Turning to leakage, assume first a uniform a priori distribution on . Then ( ) = ∞ ( ), so
in that case. But if we consider an arbitrary a priori distribution then when we Figure 1 plots the conditional vulnerability ( | ), the vulnerability ( ), the min-entropy leakage ℒ , and the mutual information leakage ( ; ) of this channel, each shown as a function of the a priori distribution = ( , 1 − ). Notice that if ≤ 1/4 or ≥ 2/3, then the min-entropy leakage is 0. The reason is that min-entropy leakage measures the improvement in 's ability to guess , given . But when ≤ 1/4, 's best guess is that is 1 , regardless of whether the output is 1 , 2 , or 3 . (Similarly, when ≥ 2/3, 's best guess is always that is 2 .) In contrast, ( ; ) is greater than 0, except when is 0 or 1.
While mutual information leakage can exceed minleakage, we conjecture that Shannon capacity cannot exceed min-capacity. To try to prove this conjecture, it appears useful to explore concepts relating to convexity and concavity. Recall that a real-valued function on a vector space is concave if for all vectors 1 , 2 and 0 ≤ ≤ 1,
(For convex, replace ≤ with ≥.) There are classic results about mutual information [14] :
• For any , ( ; ) is a concave function of . • For any , ( ; ) is a convex function of .
• Shannon capacity is a convex function of . When we turn our attention to min-entropy leakage, we can see from Figure 1 that ℒ is neither convex nor concave. However, it can be seen to be piecewise convex on the two regions ≤ 0.5 and ≥ 0.5. Following [20] , we can see that • ( ) and ( | ) are convex and piecewise linear functions of . From this, it may be possible to show that ℒ is piecewise convex in , building on [26] . Moreover, it appears possible to show that ℒ is a piecewise concave function of ; possibly these properties could be used to show that Shannon capacity cannot exceed min-capacity.
V. CHANNEL MATRIX FACTORIZATION
As stated in Theorem 3.4, factorization of a channel matrix = yields an upper bound, log | |, on the min-capacity. In this situation, we can view channels ( , ,
) and ( , , ) as being composed into a cascade [12] . 4 We can strengthen Theorem 3.4 to get bounds on the min-entropy leakage with respect to a given a priori :
) and ( , , ). Then for any a priori distribution , we have ℒ ≤ ℒ . This theorem is proved in [27] ; note that it can be seen as the min-entropy analogue of the classic data-processing inequality [7] .
Curiously, when we consider the relation between ℒ and ℒ , we find that we do not get a comparable result, as ℒ can actually exceed ℒ . But, turning to channel capacity, we do find that the min-capacity of a cascade cannot exceed the min-capacity of either link.
Finally, results on the min-entropy leakage of different forms of channel composition are important in several recent studies [28] , [29] that consider the relationship between minentropy leakage and differential privacy [30] .
VI. TECHNIQUES FOR COMPUTING MIN-ENTROPY LEAKAGE
Another important direction is the development of techniques for computing (or approximating) the min-entropy leakage of programs or systems, to verify whether they conform to a given quantitative flow policy. This is a challenging problem, as shown by the negative computational complexity results given in [31] . That paper shows that the problem of comparing the min-entropy leakage of two loop-free boolean programs is #P-hard; they give a reduction showing that one 4 One subtle point here is that having a factorization = together with an a priori distribution is not enough to uniquely determine the joint distribution on , , and . The problem is that could be dependent on . But if is invariant with respect to , then a unique joint distribution
[ , ] is obtained. can count the number of satisfying assignments of a boolean proposition (which is #P-complete) via a polynomial number of such comparison queries. More simply, suppose that is a boolean proposition and let and be the set of encodings of truth assignments for , together with at least one "bad" encoding . Consider the following program, which tests whether encodes a truth assignment that satisfies :
Since this program is deterministic, its min-capacity is the logarithm of the number of feasible outputs, which can be seen to be one more than the number of satisfying assignments of . Hence we see that the problem of counting the number of satisfying assignments of (which is #P-complete) reduces to the problem of calculating the mincapacity of a deterministic, loop-free boolean program.
Nevertheless, this is an area that is now seeing a great deal of work, both in the context of probabilistic systems [32] , [33] and deterministic imperative programs [8] , [34] , [35] , [36] .
For systems represented as probabilistic automata, Andrés et al. [32] show how to calculate the channel matrix using established model-checking techniques, including Gaussian elimination on linear equations, iterative methods involving regular expressions and strongly-connected components, and quantitative counterexample generation. In contrast, Chatzikokolakis et al. [33] estimate the channel matrix through statistical sampling, obtaining strong statistical bounds on the Shannon capacity; it is not clear whether similar bounds could be achieved for the min-capacity.
Turning to deterministic imperative programs, several recent works have used model-checking techniques to calculate the capacity; recall that, in the deterministic setting, mincapacity and Shannon capacity coincide, with both being equal to the logarithm of the number of feasible outputs.
Rather than actually trying to determine the capacity, Heusser and Malacaria [35] test whether a program has capacity at least log , for a given , by testing whether it can produce at least different outputs. To test this, they form a new program ′ that runs independently times on nondeterministically-chosen inputs, and then check (using the bounded model checker CBMC) whether there is a path to a state where all outputs are distinct. While the technique yields interesting results on leakage in real Linux kernel vulnerabilities, it is important to note that the time taken by this method grows very quickly with . Based on their experimental timings, it seems that one cannot go very much above = 128; checking with = 2 20 (corresponding to a 20-bit capacity) would appear infeasible.
Newsome, McCamant, and Song [8] estimate the capacity of x86 binaries. Interestingly, their motivation is quantitative integrity, looking at the amount of influence the untrusted input can have on the trusted output, as measured by Shannon capacity. But this again amounts to counting the number of feasible output values. They estimate this through various heuristics, using the decision procedure STP to check whether a particular output is feasible or not, and whether an interval contains any feasible outputs. Using binary search, they try to find which intervals in the range of contain feasible outputs and which do not. When they find that an interval contains at least one feasible output, they use random sampling to estimate the density of feasible outputs within it. To deal with programs whose feasible outputs are sparse and scattered, they rely complementarily on a more expensive probabilistic #SAT algorithm to estimate directly the number of feasible output values.
Meng and Smith [36] consider another approach to bounding the number of feasible output values based on two-bit patterns. Suppose that the output is bits long. They use STP to determine, for every pair ( , ) of bit positions, which of the four combinations (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) , and (1, 1) are feasible values for bits and . As an example, consider the following program from [8] : 16 solutions to the two-bit patterns, giving a mincapacity of at most log 2 16 = 16 bits, which is exact in this case. Sometimes two-bit patterns greatly overestimate the capacity, but experimentally they often seem to give quite accurate bounds.
A quite different approach to approximating leakage is given in the recent work of Köpf and Rybalchenko [34] , which uses statistical sampling to estimate the mutualinformation leakage of a deterministic imperative program from input to output , under a uniform a priori distribution. While they present the technique in terms of estimating ( | ), it is clearer to remember that the mutualinformation leakage is just ( ). They assume that for each feasible output value , we can estimate its probability (by estimating the number of values of that lead to ). Then they observe that ( ) is the expected value of 
) .
With samples, 1 , 2 , . . . , we find that ( ) is also the expected value of 1 ∑ =1 log 1 ( ) . Crucially, the variance of this last random variable is small relative to the number of possible inputs, which means that the Chebyshev inequality can be used to give good bounds on the accuracy of the estimate for not-too-large values of . However, it is not clear whether a similar technique could be used to calculate min-entropy leakage.
While the surveyed research efforts have made considerable progress, the automatic calculation of leakage has so far been done only for small programs; scaling the analyses to large systems remains a challenge.
VII. CONCLUSION
Quantitative information flow has become a vibrant research area, with rapid theoretical and practical advances. The theory of min-entropy leakage seems to be a particularly attractive framework for analyzing confidentiality properties of systems, showing promise as a useful foundation for computer security.
